A final defense of
Constellation
NASA admininstrator Mike
Griffin speaks about the agency’s exploration architecture
in a January 8 Space Transportation Association speech in
Washington. (credit: J. Foust)
by Jeff Foust
Monday, January 12, 2009
Whether his tenure as NASA administrator ends next week or next
year (and these days it’s looking more like the former than the
latter), Mike Griffin will be remembered primarily for his role
in developing and implementing the architecture of spacecraft
and launch vehicles collectively known as Constellation. When
Griffin took office in April of 2005, more than a year had
elapsed since President Bush’s declaration of the Vision for
Space Exploration but there was still no clear idea of how NASA
would carry out that plan. Five months later, though, NASA
completed the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) and
declared what that system would be: a largely shuttle-derived
pair of launch vehicles that would send a scaled-up Apollo-like
capsule and lander to the Moon. That decision wasn’t that
surprising to many since Griffin had co-chaired a Planetary
Society study the previous year that endorsed a similar approach
(see “CEV:
a different approach”, The Space Review, September
13, 2004).
Since then, NASA has made steady progress with Constellation,
letting contracts for all the elements of the Ares 1 launch
vehicle and Orion spacecraft, and more recently beginning the
early stages of the same process with the Ares 5 heavy-lift
launcher and Altair lunar lander. However, Constellation has not
been without its critics. Some raise technical concerns about
the current system, particularly the Ares 1, while others argue
that alternative architectures would be faster, less expensive,
and/or safer than the current approach (see “Staying
the course in a sea of change”, The Space Review,
December 22, 2008). And, if anything, this drumbeat of criticism
has gotten louder, not softer, in the last year.
Given this atmosphere, it’s not surprising that Griffin spent
much—nearly all, effectively—of his speech at a Space
Transportation Association (STA) breakfast on Capitol Hill on
January 8 defending Constellation against the various
alternatives that have been proposed to replace it. It’s not the
first time Griffin has done this, even to the same audience: he
spent much a speech nearly a year ago on the same topic (see“Defending
Constellation”, The Space Review, February 4, 2008),
something he noted with a bit of frustration. “From all the
questions that are still out there, I guess I didn’t do a very
good job,” he said in his opening remarks. However, this time
there was a palpable sense that this was perhaps the last time
Griffin would have a chance to discuss Constellation as NASA
administrator, even as the program faces an uncertain future in
the next administration.
Constellation versus the world
After some introductory remarks about the Vision and
Constellation, Griffin turned his attention to a number of
alternatives that have been proposed. The key theme he
identified in these alternatives is that they left out or
changed some of the requirements that Constellation had to meet.
“Many of the suggestions offered to me with the intent of
improving Constellation take this form,” he said. “The offerer
neglects a particular requirement that is disliked, and with
that omission is able to provide an improved approach for the
goals which remain.”
“Exactly what is it that makes the EELV industrial base more
important to support than the shuttle industrial base?” Griffin
asked. “Why is it, exactly, that in this time of transition in
NASA, in our spaceflight systems, we ought to be making
decisions to augment the existing Atlas and Delta workforce,
while completely decimating the shuttle workforce?”
Griffin first looked at one of the most common alternatives:
replacing Ares 1 with either an existing EELV—some version of
the Atlas 5 or Delta 4—or a new variant. The problem with using
an existing EELV, Griffin claimed, is that it would not be able
to launch the larger “lunar-capable” Orion spacecraft, only a
scaled-down version best suited for low Earth orbit (LEO)
operations. If an EELV is modified to launch the existing Orion,
he added, it would require modifications to its first stage to
allow it to launch heavier payloads, as well as a new
human-rated second stage—exactly what NASA is doing with the
Ares 1. “Why is this a good thing to do with EELV and a bad
thing to do with Ares?”
Griffin also said that a NASA probabilistic risk assessment
found that Ares 1 would be twice as safe as an EELV-derived
vehicle, a difference he said “is ignored by almost everyone
suggesting that we make a change” even though it played a major
factor in NASA’s decision to go with the shuttle-derived
architecture. “I cannot responsibly ignore it, for reasons
having nothing to do with money,” he said. For those focused
only on money, though, he noted that one additional accident of
a hypothetical lower-cost alternative system would wipe out any
cost savings it would offer.
And for those who argue that a switch to an EELV-based system
would give the struggling US launch industry some much-needed
support, Griffin effectively said he had no reason to favor the
EELV part of the industry over the shuttle part. “Exactly what
is it that makes the EELV industrial base more important to
support than the shuttle industrial base?” he asked. “Why is it,
exactly, that in this time of transition in NASA, in our
spaceflight systems, we ought to be making decisions to augment
the existing Atlas and Delta workforce, while completely
decimating the shuttle workforce? Why is that?”
Another alternative being floated is that NASA not design Ares 1
and Orion for LEO operations, allowing them to be optimized for
lunar missions while turning over human access to LEO to the
commercial sector. While Griffin has been a strong supporter of
efforts like COTS and the recently-awarded commercial cargo
resupply contracts, he sounded skeptical about depending on the
commercial sector to have a crew transportation system ready in
the foreseeable future. “All I can say about this is, if you
like the present gap in US government access to LEO, you’ll love
this one.”
Besides providing a backup for the uncertain development
schedules of commercial vehicles, Griffin said that a government
system that can access the ISS can also act “as a control on the
price” the government is willing to pay for commercial systems
as well as alternatives offered by international partners. He
also suggested that a government system might be more flexible
and robust for LEO operations than a commercial system optimized
for ISS transportation. “Do you want to do another Hubble
servicing mission, or something else like it? Do you want to do
something else in the future that you haven’t thought of today?”
he asked. “If so, you’re going to need something more than basic
commercial transportation.”
A related alternative is to keep the shuttle flying until a
commercial crewed system is ready, thus eliminating any gap in
US human spaceflight capabilities. While Griffin, as before,
expressed his desire not to rely solely on commercial systems
for LEO access, he offered a more nuanced answer on extending
the life of the shuttle. A recent NASA study found that it would
cost $3 billion a year to fly two shuttle missions a year from
2011 to 2015 to service the ISS. “As an engineer and program
manager, my immediate thought is that I’ve got better uses for
$3 billion a year than flying the shuttle to reduce, but not
eliminate, dependence upon Soyuz,” he said. While he reiterated
it was “unwise” for the US to be reliant on another nation for
access to ISS, he said he was willing to accept it for a few
years so that NASA can develop Constellation.
Stepping back to look at the big picture, though, Griffin
offered a somewhat different opinion. “One could argue that
America’s international standing will suffer as a result of our
demonstrated inability to provide transportation to the space
station we built,” he said. “Is it worth $3 billion a year, and
the risk of additional Shuttle flights, to prevent this loss of
stature, image, and clear preeminence in spaceflight? It might
be.”
While Griffin has been a supporter of COTS, he sounded
skeptical about depending on the commercial sector to have a
crew transportation system ready in the foreseeable future. “All
I can say about this is, if you like the present gap in US
government access to LEO, you’ll love this one.”
He said that he could support such a decision to extend the
shuttle’s life, provided those in the “highest levels of
government” who made that decision understood the risks involved
with flying the shuttle: about a one-in-eight chance of the loss
of the crew in those ten additional flights. However, such an
extension would have to be made with additional funding, not the
reprogramming of existing NASA budgets, which Griffin said would
only delay the gap, not eliminate it. “In the bluntest of terms,
preserving our nation’s preeminence in space by eliminating the
gap might be worth $3 billion a year and the attendant risk of
life. Spending that money and taking those risks to postpone a
gap, is not.”
Later, in a question-and-answer session following his speech,
Griffin said that if such extra money became available, spending
it all on extending the shuttle might not be the best option,
given that the money could also be applied to accelerating
Constellation. “NASA has never been asked the question of how
you would do it if the goal were to be not to have a gap in US
human spaceflight,” he said. “What combination of shuttle
extension, international dependence, and acceleration of
Constellation would you use to prevent a gap in US human
spaceflight?”
Griffin also addressed one other alternative, where the Ares 1
is cancelled and dual Ares 5 launches are used for lunar
missions. That approach would allow for 69 percent more payload
to the Moon at a cost increase of only 32 percent per mission,
and Griffin added that nothing in the Ares 5 design would
preclude allowing it to be human-rated is desired.
However, he said the Ares 1/Ares 5 approach currently planned
would be more cost-effective overall. Most alternatives to the
current system still call for the development of the Ares 5 for
lunar missions, yet many of the elements of Ares 5 would also be
used in Ares 1, from the solid rocket booster segments and J-2X
upper-stage engine to flight control systems. “Given that we
have to develop Ares 5 for the lunar mission and, later, Mars,
the additional development cost for Ares 1 is $2.7 billion,” he
said, a point he felt was so important he repeated it. “If you
commit to lunar exploration and beyond with Ares 5, then for an
additional $2.7 billion you also get the new human-rated crew
transportation system mandated by the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board.”
Griffin’s last stand?
While he did not explicitly address it in his speech, many in
attendance treated the event as one of Griffin’s last major
addresses as NASA administrator and a final defense of
Constellation. There is growing belief that Griffin will not be
retained by the Obama administration, even for a short period.
With the inauguration just over a week away, that would
effectively make this week Griffin’s last as administrator.
Some, though, are still hoping that Griffin will be kept on.
“He’s reinvigorated the human spaceflight program,” said
Congressman Ralph Hall (R-TX), ranking member of the House
Science and Technology Committee, in remarks introducing
Griffin. “I’m very hopeful he’s going to be retained. [Committee
chairman] Bart [Gordon] has recommended him, and I’ve
recommended him.” Hall added he wrote a congratulatory note to
President-elect Obama after the election, which Obama responded
to with a call. While Hall wasn’t in the office when the call
came, he said he hoped to connect with Obama at some point,
suggesting he would bring up Griffin’s status in that
conversation.
“How do you turn it into a negative?” Griffin said of
Horowitz’s petition. “Why did we all in the Washington community
cringe when that came out? Because we in the Washington
community are all so damn cynical that we knew that something
like that will backfire.”
Griffin has also been the subject of some unusual
lobbying efforts, including an
online petition organized
by former astronaut Scott “Doc” Horowitz last month. That
petition has garnered nearly 3,000 “signatures” since its
release, ranging from astronauts and other NASA employees to
members of the general public and even “anonymous” signatures.
The petition got additional attention when Griffin’s wife sent
out an email to her contacts asking them to sign the petition.
Asked about the petition after his speech,
Griffin went through a mix of emotions. “I was embarrassed, of
course, when it was conveyed to my attention,” he said, but also
said he was “very honored” that Horowitz—who Griffin described
as a “national hero” for being an astronaut—would do it. He
noted, though, that the petition generated some negative
reaction. “How do you turn it into a negative?” he asked. “Why
did we all in the Washington community cringe when that came
out? Because we in the Washington community are all so damn
cynical that we knew that something like that will backfire… So
how do we get to a place in Washington where somebody doing
something nice for you is viewed as ammunition for your enemies?
How does that happen?”
If Griffin’s tenure is near an end, who might
replace him? The list of candidates is a long one, and got even
longer last week. On Tuesday came word that former astronaut
Charles Bolden had emerged as a leading candidate to replace
Griffin. It would not be the first time Bolden had been
considered for a leading NASA position: in 2002 he was nominated
to become deputy administrator shortly after Sean O’Keefe became
administrator. However, the nomination was withdrawn after some
opposition to having an active-duty military officer—Bolden was
a major general in the Marine Corps, but has since
retired—serving in a civilian position during a time of war.
Bolden, at least publicly, said he had not been
touch with Obama’s transition team about the post. “The only
comment on that story I can offer you is that nobody has talked
to me in an official capacity,” he responded during a
previously-scheduled webcast organized by the Conrad Foundation
on January 6. “I have not visited with the transition team or
anybody from the Obama administration. I’m incredibly honored
that my name would be floated around but those are things I
haven’t been approached about yet so I can’t offer you an
opinion or anything.”
Later in the week, Space
News reported that
Charles Kennel, a former director of the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography and chair of the Space Studies Board of the
National Academies, was now under consideration to lead NASA.
Kennel had served at NASA in the mid-1990s as associate
administrator for the agency’s Earth sciences program, then
known as “Mission to Planet Earth”. He later served on the NASA
Advisory Council (NAC) from 1998 to 2006, including a stint as
chair of the council from 2001 and 2005. He abruptly resigned
from the NAC in August 2006 at the same time two other members,
also scientists, were asked to leave. According to the Space
News report, the Obama transition team is interested in having a
“distinguished scientist” lead NASA, just as it did with its
picks for Secretary of Energy and presidential science advisor.
The two Charleses may offer very different
futures for NASA in general and Constellation in particular.
Bolden, after his retirement from the Marines, did some lobbying
work for ATK, a company that has strongly supported the current
exploration architecture. On the other hand, some worry that the
selection of a scientist like Kennel might mean a retrenchment
in Constellation or human spaceflight in general. In any case,
the administration’s selection of Griffin’s replacement could be
the first clear sign of what direction they will go in space—and
just how effective Griffin’s staunch defense of NASA’s
exploration architecture was.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com)
is the editor and publisher of The Space Review. He also
operates the Spacetoday.net web
site and the Space
Politics andPersonal
Spaceflight weblogs.
Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the
author alone, and do not represent the official positions of any
organization or company, including the Futron Corporation, the
author’s employer.